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This thesis contains an examination, analysis and
commentary on the projecx^d surge in the world's demand for
coal as a principal energy source and how this impacts upon
United States port development policy. It provides back-
ground on both the export coal trade and port development
and then examines the central issues facing the federal
government and the private sector as to how to increase port
capacities to meet this new demand for export coal. A
cost-benefit analysis of the alternative methods for coal
related port development is conducted. This is followed by
the presentation of an optimization model which can assist
in prioritizing dredging projects in U.S. ports to gain
maximum increased coal export capacity for a particular
investment ceiling. Finally, a set of general and specific
conclusions and recommendations are offered concerning
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I. INTRODUCTION AND OBJECTIVES
A. GENERAL
The second major increase in world oil prices after the
shock of the initial embargo of 1973, occurred in 1979.
This new price hike effected a conversion of many of the
remaining doubters or "fence-sitters" worldwide to a belief
in the need for strenuous efforts to develop alternative,
less costly forms of energy. The most readily available
source of industrial fuel was coal, which the United States
has in abundance. Reaction in the world energy market
caused the overall demand for U.S. coal to soar 39 percent
from 1979 levels to 90 million tons in 1980 [Ref- 1: p-'*]-
As a consequence of this rise, even skeptical observers now
maintain that after a period of market normalization, world-
wide need for U.S. coal will continue to expand at a rapid
rate and, by the year 2000, will have grown to a trade of
more than a quarter of a billion tons per year
[Refs. 1: p-5; 2: p. 492]- As the world's greatest source of
recoveratle coal reserves, the U.S. is bound to play a
significant part in future world coal trade. Whether this
part will be passive or active and the extent of its even-
tual market share depend in large measure on policy deci-
sions which must be made by the federal government in the
near future.
Export coal consists of two types: metallurgical
(coking) coal, used in the manufacture of steel and other
alloys, and steam coal which is burned in the generation of
electrical power. The market for both commodities worldwide
is virtually assured, although the increase in coal demand
during the last three years has been based largely on a
10

disproportionate increase in the steam coal market.
According to Ulf Lantzke , the Director of the highly
respected, Paris-based, International Energy Agency, "the
world coal supply must at least triple by the end of this
century if we are to have adequate energy supplies to accom-
modate even moderate levels of growth" [Ref. 3: p. 351].
This projection appears to be based solely on routine
economic growth and does not consider the reliability of
petroleum sources in the politically unstable Persian Gulf
states over the next 20 years, nor the continued public
uneasiness and the political hazards associated with
continued efforts to expand the use of nuclear power in
public utilities.
According to several authoritative sources
[Refs. 1;2;3], the expanded use of coal not only eases
worldwide economic development in a general sense, but has
two specific benefits for the 0. S. First, as a major
supplier of coal the U.S. may bind its allies closer and
gain more support in foreign policy since these nations in
substituting coal for other energy forms will emancipate
themselves from the threat of a third world oil embargo.
Second, the balance of payments implications of projected
coal export increases are enormous. Revenues of $30 billion
dollars per year from coal exports alone may be possible by
the year 2000. These benefits are not, however, inevitable.
They are dependent en specific governmental action.
The U.S. has failed to formulate a distinct public
policy on coal export, other than noncommitally, through
generally supportive statements as to the importance of
increased coal usage in the developed nations. Economic
summits, such as that held in Venice in 1979, have served as
forums for the issuance of these calls fcr international
cooperation between the developed nations to boost the
11

international coal trade. Specific governmental actions,
however, are not in evidence. Definitive policy is needed,
particularly in the port loading and ocean transportation
links of the mine to market economic chain of export coal
(see Figure 1.1). The importance of these two links is
associated with the cost structure peculiar to U.S. export
coal. The cost components of loading and shipping coal are
most amenable to change due to capital and labor concentra-
tions related to the various links in the coal chain through
which pricing is derived, A direct consequence of pricing
is the relative competitiveness which U.S. coal can achieve
in the world market. This, in turn, will establish the path
which the U.S. export industry will take in the future
[Ref. 2: p-435].
Importers worldwide look for reasonable pricing in
energy stocks and reliability in energy sources. Both of
these attributes can be directly influenced by legislation
and/or executive action. A clearly articulated choice on
coal export and port development alternatives will provide a
basic parameter to the U. S. coal export trade. Public
policy, which must be made in the near terra, will directly
affect the U.S. position and role in the world coal market
into the next century,
B. OBJECTIVE
Several competing methods of marine coal loading have
been advocated, yet no prioritization of these developmental
proposals exists [Hef. 1: p. 9]. The objective of this study
is to provide a method for the systematic formulation of
fundamental public policy regarding the future development
of marine loading terminals tc meet and stimulate the demand
for U.S. export coal. This policy will be stated in such a
way that a clear choice and prioritization of the several




























Figure 1.1 Typical Export Coal Chain
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the candidate projects with the development costs considered
secondarily. Chapter IV provides a second level of refine-
ment of the evaluation and includes a method for the priori-
tization of coal port dredging projects in the U.S. This
ranking method provides a clear statement of which projects
should be undertaken first to gain maximum capacity
increases for a given cost ceiling. This analysis concludes
with Chapter V wherein general conclusions from the research
are integrated with policy recommendations and suggestions
for further research in this field are made.
14

II. COAL EXPORT ISSUES
This chapter presents the background of the coal export
trade issues currently facing both government and commerce.
It provides the foundation upon which subsequent analysis is
built. The first section of the chapter briefly summarizes
the history of coal export from the Unites States up to
1979. The second section discusses the radical changes
which have occurred in the world coal market since 1979,
which have given rise to forecasts of a greatly increased
U.S. role in the export market. The third and fourth
sections present the competing, though sometimes
complementary, proposals for coal terminal systems
development which the U. S. government may choose to
support, together with a description of the government's
historical role in the general development of marine
terminals in support of U.S. trade.
A. BACKGROUND OF THE U.S. COAL EXPORT INDUSTRY
As the early settlers advanced inland from the Eastern
seaboard, the initial coal deposits which would provide the
fuel and raw material for the Industrial Revolution in the
United States were discovered in the Appalachian Mountains
of Pennsylvania, Virginia and West Virginia. By the late
nineteenth century a small export trade in metallurgical
coal had developed with Canada and t.he east coast of South
America. This trade gradually increased to 38 million tons
per year in 1920 before dropping off to 9 million tons in
193 2 during the depths of the Great Depression
[Ref. 1: p-34]. Peaks were again reached in 1947 (69
million tons) and 1957 (76.4 million tons), the all time
15

pre-1980 high [ Ref . 4: p.59 ]. While coal has been found in
31 of the 50 states, the infr astuct ure which developed for
the expert of coal to countries other than Canada has devel-
oped principally around four East Coast marine terminals
operated by regional railroads at Hampton Roads, Baltimore,
and to a much smaller extant Philadelphia and Mobile. Coal
is also found in great abundance in the Rocky Mountain and
Great Plains states. The transportation network supporting
mining operations in these areas goes east to the
Mississippi River or west to port cities located in
California, Oregon or Washington. The amount of export
trade in coal from the western U.S. is still very small in
comparison with its East Coast counterpart. The coal
traffic conducted via the Great Lakes with Canada has been
treated by the coal trade itself as a separate industry and
will nor be considered in this study. The two reasons for
this are that the export trade in coal with Canada is
expected to wane over the next 20 years and the 25,000 dead-
weight ton (dwt) limitation on vessels transiting the St.
Lawrence Seaway effectively inhibits any real .expansion of
the expert trade outside the confines of the Great Lakes,
The coal export trade from the United States in 1977 was
one which could have been characterized as a mature industry
(see Table I). This bituminous coal was used in the coking
process for metallurgical and other industrial applications
rather than in generation of power for utilities. Growth
was moderate and projected to remain so [Ref. U: p. 61].
Apparently unaffected by the ini-ial Arab oil embargo of
1973, petro-energy still remained relatively cheap worldwide
so that finding an alternative to the then widely used oil
and natural gas stocks for the generation cf power had not
become a critical economic factor. For all practical





































































































































utilities did not exist. Excess export capacity existed,
both in terms of inland transportation and marine terminal
loading capabilities. No real growth in steam coal exports
was forecasted by the Energy Information Administration in
its report to Congress for 1977 [Ref. 4: p. 61].
The power of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) and the price of petroleum based fuels had
been on the rise since the early 1970' s. The fossil fuel
equation, the balance of coal, petroleum and natural gas
17

needed tc meet a nation's mass energy requirements (e.g.
electric power generation), was drastically altered in 1979
when OPEC nearly doubled its product prices. The nations of
Western Europe and Japan immediately sought alternative
fossil fuel energy sources. Among the most readily avail-
able was steam coal abundant in both the eastern and western
regions of the U.S. According to Dr. Rex Sherman, Director
of Research for the American Association of Port
Authorities, the U.S. exported 311,000 tons of steam coal in
1978. Total coal exports for that year were in the neigh-
borhood of 55 million tons; steam coal represented less than
one half of one percent of the trade. Oil price hikes
coupled with labor problems in Australian coal mines caused
1979 U.S. steam coal exports to nations other than Canada to
reach 2.5 million tons. By 1980 this rrade had exploded to
16 million tons of steam coal out of an overall total of 90
million tons exported. 1981 's totals, when finally
computed, should indicate steam coal exports at between 25
and 30 million tons on total exports of 110 million tons.
This represents a fifty-fold increase in the quantity of
steam coal exported from the U.S. in a period of three
years. While demand in this market has softened somewhat
during the first quarter of 1982 as a result of stockpiling
by European nations and the worldwide economic slowdown, the
long term prospects for increases in the export of steam
coal remain excellent.
This surge in demand, while a boon to East Coast coal
operators and major coal exporting railroads such as the
Norfolk 5 Western and the CSX system, created chaos at the
ill-prepared major marine loading points. For example,
through 1980 Hampton Roads had as many as 60 colliers at a
time waiting in the roadstead. These ships were delayed in
loading an average of six weeks, incurring daily demurrage
18

costs of between $15,000-2 0,000 per ship. [Ref- 5: p. 1 ].
Demurrage is the cost of operating a vessel while it is
waiting for a berth to take on its cargo and raises the
final cost of this cargo at its destination. This waiting
cost is truly a no-win situation since it can be translated
directly into lower profits for both the importers, whose
product prices go higher, and the exporters, who lose busi-
ness when the price of their product rises and demand
slackens. At the other extreme from the crowded conditions
prevailing en the East coast, the West Coast had no dedi-
cated coal export infrastructure at all.
Aggravating an already difficult situation was an
initial reluctance by the U.S. coal export industry to enter
into long term contracts with Western European and Japanese
importers. These contracts would have added some measure of
stability to what had become a volatile market. The basis
for the caution exhibited by major coal companies like
Norfolk 5 Western, A. T. Massey and Pittston toward long term
contractual arrangements was uncertainty regarding the dura-
tion of the demand, the future of interstate freight rates
for coal hauling by rail and the absence of federal govern-
ment plans for port development (specifically a 55' (''6.3
meters) minimum channel depth) to allow future use of large
colliers in the neighborhood of 150,000 dwt in major Eastern
and Gulf coast ports. The current channel depth in these
ports averages 40 feet(12.2 meters), limiting collier size
to 50,000-60,000 dwt. The combination of long queues of
colliers outside the ports and the resultant high demurrage,
spot pricing of coal, and lack of deepwater ports was, in
fact, contrary to all of the major importers' objectives.
The price of U.S. steam coal landed in the target market
quickly rose above the competition. Our principal competi-
tors. South Africa and Australia, were more than eager to
19

provide or at least plan for these same services. The gilt
edges of the U.S. steam coal export market began to tarnish.
Sample coal prices are provided in Table II. These prices
are based on the use of colliers in the 25,000-60,000 dwt
category.
TABLE II
Selected Current International Steam Coal and Shipping
Prices (averaged, U.S. 1981 dollars/ton)
Price Ocean* Delivered
£2B 22li Freight Price
U.S. east coast to NW Europe. $50 $18 $68
Poland to West Europe 54 8 62
South Africa to Europe U3 13 56
Australia to Europe 44 26 70
U.S. east coast to Japan .... 50 28 78
South Africa to Japan 43 22 68
Australia to Japan 44 16 60
lOcean freight cost dees not include additions of $6 to $10
per ten now charged as demurrage for those ships waiting to
load at Baltimore and Hampton Roads,
Source: Coal Week International. Mar. 18 and 25, 1981.
Since 1980, some progress towards lowering demurrage has
been made. The Staggers Act (1980) has lessened the federal
government's regulation of the railways which has allowed
two major coal exporters, Norfolk 5 Western and the CSX
System to enter into longer term contracts with foreign
importers. An interview with a spokesman for the Virginia
Port Authority [ Ref . 31], a state agency controlling the
operations of the Port of Hampton Roads, indicated that
these contracts coupled with increased efficiencies in rail
transport and yard operations by the Norfolk 5 Western have
been effective in reducing the queue of colliers to be
loaded and the average waiting time to twenty ships and two
to three weeks, respectively. Moreover, this queue is to
20

load coal not under contract. The delay for vessels under
long term contract has been reduced to zero through a reser-
vation system with two-way penalties. If either the
exporter or the importer is not prepared to load on the
agreed upon date, then the party responsible will be held
liable for the additional costs incurred as a result of that
delay. Industry spokesmen remain unsure of future demand
stability because of the anticipated use of the super-col-
liers (150,000 - 200,000 dwt) in the post-1990 timeframe
(see Appendix A) and are already clamoring for expedited
action on port dredging operations [Ref. 6: p-30].
TABLE III
Average Daily Cost of Vessels
60,000 dwt 100,000 dwt 150,000 dw!
Daily Capital Cost "11073013 1137^77 I1H772^""
Daily Fuel Cost 17,400 21,900 24,300
Daily Vessel
Expenses 3,900 i£/6 23 5,23 3
Total 31,600 U0,500 U7,762
Daily Cost Per Ton .527 .405 .318
Source:
T!arr?ime Administration, December 1980 (Ref- 9: p. 22].
While demurrage may be down from highs of $8 to $10 per
ton of loaded coal [Hef- 7: p.13] as a result of contractual
expediting and efficiencies gained ashore, this temporary
advance toward the solution to the coal problem will soon be
eclipsed by deficiencies in terminal capacities and the
increasing burden of ocean transport costs
[Refs- 1; 2; 3; 7]. The latter represents 20 to 30 percent
of the overall cost of delivered coal [Ref. 8: p. 173].
Table III depicts the economies of scale to be gained in
21

vessel operating costs through the use of larger ships.
Figure 2,1 demonstrates the effect on the price of a ton of
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A. The distance from China to Japan or
Inter-European trade.
B- The distance from anited States East Coast to
West Europe.
C. The distance from South Africa to Japan or Wes"'
Europe.
D. The distance from Norrh American East Coast to
Japan and American West Coast to Eurooe.
E. The distance from Australia to West Europe.
Source: S;team Coal Prospects to 2000, OECD 1978.
Figure 2.1 Economies of Scale in Maritime Transport
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Table III and Figure 2.1 lead to the same conclusion:
the price of delivered coal can be lowered through the use
of larger ships. The longer the distance, the greater the
saving. There is a strong incentive among exporters and
importers alike to lower costs in this area. The United
States, however, has been restricted from enjoying these
economies of scale by the controlling depth of the ports
where the coal terminals are located [Ref. 10].
The net relative effect on the delivered price of coal
from the major suppliers resulting from these economies of
scale in shipping is shown in Table IV. This table has been
derived from the information contained in Table II, Figure
2.1 and other price data available from industry sources.
Delivered price is the sum of the freight on board (FOB)
cost of the coal at the loading port plus the ocean freight
charges- Table 17 indicates that the potential for greatest
price improvement is in the East Coast coal trade with
Europe in which the U.S. can become much more competitive
with South Africa.
TABLE IV
Comparative Price of Coal at Destination by Vessel Size
Delivered Price
60,000 dwt 150,000 dwt
To Europe from:
United States (east coast) $63 53
South Africa 56 5a
Australia 70 61
To Japan from:
United States (west coast) 70 63




B, O.S. COAL EXPORT PROJECTIONS
Intense interest in the future of the rapidly acceler-
ating steam coal trade has been generated in the market-
place. Industry analysts discarded the low export
projections presented in 19 78 by the President's Commission
on Coal [ Ref . U] and sought out new and more reliable
sources of information- Spurred on, perhaps, by the far-
sighted analysts at the International Energy Agency in
Paris, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology commis-
sioned an internationally staffed World Coal Study (WOCOL)
in October 1978 to forecast the supply and demand structure
associated with coal through the year 2000 [Refs. 2; 8].
The preliminary results were made available in mid-1980 and
appear to have had a profound effect on importers and
exporters alike. Further, the WOCOL conclusions were gener-
ally corroborated by the Carter Administration's Interagency
Coal Export Task Force (ICE) formed in rhe spring of 1980.
These two study efforts represent the base from which most
subseguent analyses embark.
The projections used by WOCOL and ICE give three fore-
casted levels of coal export. The first is the "low coal
case" which represents the minimum demand for coal through
the year 2000. The second level is the "high coal case"
which represents the amount of coal reguired worldwide if
all the conversion efforts, future policy decisions, and
assumptions used in the studies are carried forward. The
last case is the so called "sensitivity case" which extrapo-
lates what would happen to the figures of the "high coal
case" if there were a drastically reduced use of nuclear
power worldwide and the price of crude oil escalated faster
than forecasted as the result of a significant curtailment
of supply. This study will proceed on the assumption that
the "high coal case" is the most likely.
2U

The basic conclusions of the WOCOL and ICE studies,
while startling to many, achieved immediate and near unani-
mous acceptance. They were bolstered by the fact that 1981
steam coal exports of approximately 30 million tons matched
the WOCOL "high" case projections for 1985. The following
list of points represent an amalgamation of the conclusions
reached by WOCOL, ICE, the Congressional Office of
Technology Assessment (OTA) and other more specific studies
relating to the growth and nature of the O.S. export coal
trade as they effect the objecxive of this analysis:
1. Coal will have to supply at least one half to two
thirds of all additional energy needed for the next 20
years.
2. To meet the above requirement, world coal production
must increase 2-5 to 3 times by 2000.
3. The combined world coal market will increase 3 to 5
fold during this same period, while the trade in steam
coal will grow by a factor of between 5-12, from 60
million tons per year to between 300-680 million tons
per year.
4. Ninety percent of the world's coal reserves are
contained in the U.S.S.R., U.S., Australia and China,
but the only nations which will be able to economi-
cally recover the coal and engage in meaningful trade
will be the O.S., Australia, and to a lesser extent
South Africa and Canada.
5. Only Australia and the U.S. have the individual poten-
tial of exporting 100 million tons of steam coal per
year; only the latter*s potential exceeds 200 million
tons. The two nations together must supply one half
of the world's new energy requirements. U.S. steam
coal exports by 2000 are projected at 65-280 million
tons per year wi-h the higher end of the range given
more credence (200 million tons according to ICE).
25

6- Long term prices and contracts are essential for the
maintenance of stability in the market.
7. Major expansion of railway, barge transport and marine
terminal loading systems will be required.
8. Transportation costs can be the deciding factor in
establishing the balance of competition among distant
sources of coal particularly with the steady increase
in bunker fuel prices.
9. International shipbuilding to meet the requirements of
this expanded trade must exceed 50 colliers or five
million dwt per year for the next 20 years and the
displacement of the average collier will grow
substantially from its current average of
60,000-80,000 dwt.
10. Regulatory and institutional processes for the expan-
sion of ports in the U.S. represent the single
greatest obstacle to that nation's meeting or
exceeding its market share.
11. Currently the O.S. is the only major producer of coal
whose export potential exceeds importer preference.
12. Ocean transportation costs represent 20-30 percent of
the overall cost of coal.
13. The United States can garner a stable share of the
market as long as U.S. prices for delivered coal
remain within 10 percent of its competitors.
14. Security and diversity of supply sources are nearly as
important factors in the attractiveness of U.S. coal
on the world market as price is.
15. Early decisions on harbor dredging are important if
U.S. coal export potential is to be realized. Port




16. Demurrage free throughput of export coal based on 1995
demand projections will require an inplace loading
capacity of at least 238 million tons per year-
17. Non-conventional means for the inland transport and
maritime loading of coal in the form of slurry pipe-
lines is a proven technology.
18. Bulk carriers (excluding oil/bulk combined carriers)
in excess of 60,000 d wt will make up 30 percent of the
world's fleet by 1990.
19. The Mississippi River Basin portion of the Inland
Waterway will not accommodate greatly increased coal
targe traffic without significant up-grading of the
Gallipolis lock complex and the Pittsburg-Three Rivers
Region.
20. While contested by local operators, transhipment of
coal through the Great Lakes will play an insignifi-
cant part in the a.S. coal export trade.
21. If the U.S. can remain competitive, the steam coal
export trade will provide $15.0 billion or more annu-
ally in foreign exchange by 2000.
C. ALTERNATIVE MARINE LOADING METHODS FOR O.S. COAL
In seeking the best policy by which the federal govern-
ment can most effectively stimulate the O.S. coal export
trade, a key determinant is the cost of *:he method or
methods selected for coal loading at marine terminals. The
situation is, to some degree, analogous to the one faced by
the federal government and the oil companies in -he early
1970' s. Supertankers had become a reality and had defini-
tively lowered the transportation costs fcr imported oil,
but no ports on the East and Gulf Coasts could accommodate
these mammoth ships which ranged in size up to 250,000 dwt.
The Ports of Los Angeles/Long Beach and terminal points in
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Puget Sound in the state of Washington were the only loca-
tions with sufficient depth to handle the large vessels.
The alternatives available to the respective players then
are the same ones currently studied:
1. No action required. Port operations would continue as
before. Transshipment points outside the continental
Dnited States capable of handling very large ships
would be used.
2- Dredge the U.S. ports currently engaged in the trade
to a depth which would allow the large vessels to be
used with conventional loading methods.
3. Pursue unconventional loading technology which might
save large capital investment costs and avoid the
lengthy process of obtaining all the approvals neces-
sary to begin a large dredging project. This part of
port development is known as the "permitting" process
and is addressed in some detail below.
While the technology employed in the loading and trans^
portation of petroleum has application in the movement of
coal, the crucial difference in the policy perspectives of
the two situations is that the former was in support of a
costly though necessary import, while the latter is in
support of a valuable export which can have a very favorable
effect on U.S. trade balance of payments. The decision made
in 1972 was for minimal and passive government participation
in the marine loading methods chosen thus allowing the
private sector to determine the best alternative. The oil
companies chose a combination of continued reliance on tran-
shipment for the East coast, development of offloading
terminals at deepwater ports on the West coast and use of an
offshore buoy system for the direct off-loading of deep
draft tankers at several locations. The first of these buoy
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projects has just been completed at the mouth of the
Mississippi River and it took an act of Congress, the Deep
Water Port Act (197U) , to establish the procedures and regu-
latory structure before such an undertaking could even be
started [fief. 11: 17, p.5]- Other such projects, including
one off the coast of Texas, are being considered
[Ref. 12: p. 19].
The federal government appears to be adopting a more
active role regarding coal. Stimulation of this trade is
not only beneficial for the balance of payments, but stands
to benefit the mining and shipping points substantially. A
recently completed study for the Virginia Port Authority
estimates that ten thousand new jobs, generating two hundred
million dollars in payroll are created for every ten million
tons of coal exported through the port of Hampton Roads
[Ref. 9: p. 36]. As in the case of the proposed oil ports of
the mid-1970's, it still appears politically naive to
justify the expenditure of a large sum for the development
of a port based solely on the benefits from a single
commodity. A broader approach which cons'iders all the
socio-economic aspects of a particular port's development
appears better balanced politically, standing a better
chance of success.
It must be recognized that the choices relating to which
marine loading method to support and where the marine
terminal is to be situated are complex political as well as
economic decisions. The current flurry of legislative
activity in the Congress pertaining to port development is a
clear reflection of interest in this area. Leaving the
specific details of each method until Chapter III, the
following represents a synopsis of the candidate loading
alternatives- These should act as background for the
ensuing discussion of issues facing the federal government
in the general area of port development:
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1. Construct artificial islands offshore as transhipment
terminals to accommodate super colliers. The coal
will be moved to these points by barge or smaller
colliers.
2. Transport coal conventionally to the coast for
processing into slurry and pump to offshore buoys for
Icading-
3- Construct a slurry pipeline complex from mineheads in
the interior to offshore loading buoys for transoce-
anic transport by super tanker or specifically config-
ured super colliers.
U. Undertake no federally funded port improvements in
U.S. ports, relying on the marketplace to provide the
necessary incentive for investment by the private
sector.
5. Initiate improvements in the Inland Waterway system to
provide a single deepwater export terminal at the
mouth of the Mississippi River.
6. Dredge selected U.S. ports to a 55 foot depth to
accommodate conventionally designed super colliers of
up to 150,000-175,000 dwt displacement.
. ISSUES FACING THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN POET DEVELOPMENT
The federal government has, until very recently, played
pivotal role in U.S. port development through the
financing and oversight of all channel and turning basin
construction. The source of this authority is found in two
documents: the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, section 9
which mandated a federal port development policy which would
be free from any bias, commercial or otherwise; and the
General Survey Act of 1824 which established Congressional
funding actions for the creation and maintenance of navi-




inhibited the development of a sysxem of prioritization for
port development projects. The second document introduced
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers into the process. Today,
many organizations in both the legislative and executive
branches of the federal government are part of the Public
Works funding and oversight process. All major construction
projects and maintenance of the channels in the ports have,
until recently, been funded with federal monies. In
contrast to this, offshore development in the form of oil
platforms and buoy systems has been promoted by the private
sector. A tradition has been established in the marketplace
to view these dredging projects and maintenance services as
free goods. By this it is meant that no specific taxes or
use fees have been levied against the principal benefici-
aries of these public works, the ports and the shipping
industry. No other sector in the transportation industry
currently enjoys such a benefit. The highway taxes paid by
the trucking industry help support the highways; the sums
paid by the airlines in order to use the nation's airports
help recoup the cost of the airport itself as well as pay
for its operations. It seems, therefore, inequitable rhat
continued investment in dredging should be the financial
responsibility of the federal government alone.
Marine construction, particularly channel dredging, has
become a very costly undertaking. For example, necessary
channel improvements to drop channel depth to 55 feet for
the four major U.S. ports, Hampton Roads, Baltimore, Mobile
and New Orleans, will cost in the vicinity of 1.5 billion
1980 dollars [ Ref . 1: p. 1 9 ]. This money is not readily
available in this era of ever increasing federal deficit
budgeting. More restricting than the availability of funds,
however, is an entrenched regulatory procedure which




Port depth restriction to ships designed to meat the
Panama Canal's maximum specifications (PANAMAX) will be felt
most acutely in the metallurgical coal market. This is due
to the larger steel manufacturers' desire to take maximum
advantage of the economies of scale offered by large ships
(as much as a 50 percent cost advantage is gained when
150,000 dwt ship is used in place of a PANAMAX of 60,000
dwt) . Consequently deepwater marine terminals, particularly
in Japan, have been built at the off-loading points adjacent
to the steel mills [Ref. 13: p. 5]. This in no way is meant
to imply that the steam coal trade will be unaffected. The
consensus of the coal industry is that the U.S. will not be
able to meet its full potential in the international coal
market unless it can cater to the full spectrum of collier-
types projected for the 1990-2000 timeframe. The above
should net be construed as a requirement for all the ports
engaged in the coal trade to be dredged to 55 feet. To the
contrary, as noted in section B above, by 1990 30 percent of
the world's bulk fleet will exceed PANAMAX specifications,
therefore, 10 percent of the trade will still be carried in
vessels 60,000 dwt or less. The implication here is that
there is still a role to be played by the ports whose depth
does not exceed 40 feet. We must, however, be able to accom-
modate the larger ships at minimally one port per coast.
No major federally funded port expansion project has
begun in the U.S. in the last five years. This tightness in
funds coupled with an excessively long process to obtain the
necessary environmental and financial permits to dredge and
the current administration's philosophy on the Federal
government's role in local development has precipitated the
introduction of legislation in the Congress which would
shift the decision and cost for channel deepening and
maintenance away from the federal government to local
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authorities [ Eef . 1U: p. 31]. Appendix 3 contains a synopsis
of the bills currently under consideration. There is little
hope that any of these proposals will become law in the near
future.
The central issues involved in these policy initiatives
are first, the proportionate sharing of dredging costs
between the public and private sectors and the mechanisms
for assessment, cost recovery and capital formation; and
second, the streamlining of the currently long complex and
expensive process necessary to obtain approval before a
dredging process can be started.
1 • Cost Sharing
While in the past the ports have rarely shouldered
any of the financial burden of channel construction and
maintenance, according to the President of the American
Association of Port Authorities, Mr. J. Ron Brinson, U.S.
ports are willing to share the cost of needed channel
improvements with the federal government, if this action
will actually contribute to accelerated port development
[Ref. 15: p-9]- Cost sharing can be accomplished via two
means, either by the levy of a cost recovery user fee on the
identified beneficiaries of the improved port facilities or
through direct contribution by the port in the form of a
lump sum which could be raised through the sale of state or
municipal bonds. There is an almost infinite variety of
combinations of these two mechanisms. The debate centers
around whether a national standard for channel depth (e.g.
45 feet) should be established, what proportion of the
construction, operating and maintenance costs will be borne
by the federal government, and finally whether a payback
scheme or a "pay as you go" arrangement will be mandated.
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Port and export coal industry officials appear unan-
imous in their opinion that a ^^5 feet channel depth should
be set as a nationwide standard for commercial ports
processing more than one million tons of cargo per year.
Currently 36 percent of these ports have less than U5 feet,
while 56 percent have less than UO feet. The opinion of the
fourteen major ports in the U.S., as expressed by the
Executive Director of the Port of Long Beach
[Ref. 16: p-11lr is that the federal government should
continue full financing of channels to 45 feet. Projects to
deepen these waterways beyond that benchmark should be
shared by local interests and the federal government.
Naturally enough, the vast majority of the nation's smaller
ports support this same position [Ref. 17: p. 13]. The
industry is again unanimous in stating that 100 percent cost
recovery by the federal government will be impossible
[Refs, 15; 16; 17]. A review of pending legislation
concerning this issue reveals that in large measure this is
also recognized by the lawmakers.
The area where disagreement abounds ^mong the ports
and among the legislators is the user fee itself. The large
ports suggest a locally determined fee while the smaller
ports want a national standard fee. Both sides have well
grounded arguments in support of their respective position,
but a glance at the economies of scale enjoyed by large
ports with large volumes of trade tells the real story.
These large volume ports view a national standard fee as a
direct subsidy to the smaller ports. The large volume port
could assess a smaller individual user fee and gain imme-
diate competitive advantage. Large and small ports alike
have their spokesmen in Congress, the proposed
Moy nihan-Abdnor Bill seems to favor the larger ports, while
the Hatfield Bill represents the interest of the smaller
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ones. As noted in Appendix B there are many positions in
b €t w e en
.
Some analysts feel that the debate over the specific
issue of cost sharing for dredging obscures a larger issue.
From their vantage point, the dredging issue cannot be sepa-
rated from the overall port development framework
[Ref. 1: p. 23]. If it cannot be, then the billions of
dollars of private sector investment in the ports must be
considered. In this more historical context, the federal
contribution in the overall cost-sharing picture is picayune
by comparison. Reaganomics and the current Administration's
philosophy aside, several substantial arguments have been
presented against cost sharing. Detailed presentations are
contained in Reference 1. The overall result of cost
sharing, say the opponents, will be an unequal and disrup-
tive economic advantage going to the larger ports and
unavoidable additional cost being attached to each ton of
export coal.
In summary, the issue is a thorny one and will not
be easily -resolved. There does not appear to be a right and
wrong, rather it is a philosophical choice as to which size
of port to support.
2 . Expedited Dredging
The government's performance has really been non-
performance. It has carried out its end of the
port development partnership role in a manner
marked more by dilatoriness than a resoonsibility
to the nation's interest in a modern and efficient
seaport, system affording maximum options to ship-
. gers and recievers. .. The federal government has
g commentary
the federal government's responsiveness to the




[Ref. 15: p. 9]
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The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has had responsi-
bility for creating and maintaining deep water and inland
waterway facilities since 182U. During this time a lengthy
and complicated procedure has evolved in which the Corps
performs or supervises all design engineering and cost-ben-
efit analysis on dredging reguests received from the locali-
ties. Once this work has been completed, the proposals are
transmitted to Congressional Public Works Committees for
authorization and appropriation action using the Executive
Budget as the vehicle. Once the funds have been appropri-
ated, the Corps then becomes responsible for the management
of the construction phase and all subsequent operations and
maintenance. This entire sequence of events is normally
referred to as the permitting process.
Mr. Brinson' s estimate on the amount of time it
takes to complete a federally funded dredging project is not
extreme according to authoritative sources in the litera-
ture. It is a long and complicated process involving
Congress and several agencies within the executive branch.
Appendix C contains the nineteen steps required by the Army
Corps of Engineers. Entwined with this is the inexorable
path which a public works project must follow through the
authorization and appropriations process in Congress. While
construction times can vary as a function of either a
project's scale or the availability of funds, the permitting
process itself can last as long as 13 to 20 years prior to
the start of construction. The permitting process is
unwieldly, inefficient and seriously jeopardizes expansion
of U.S. trade if port development is any measure of this.
Many ways to accelerate the process have been
proposed. These would affect not oaly the study and review
procedures, but the legislative process as well.
36

3 . Project Prioritizin g
With a heritage as a coal exporting nation and the
bright prospects of a greatly expanded demand for coal, the
outlook for the U.S. coal exporr industry should be bright.
A major obstacle in realizing this future is the nearly
inexorable process of public works approval. Dredging, the
backbone of port development, is but one form of publically
funded project whose impact as a tool for economic growth is
mitigated by time. A critical review of the entire permit-
ting and funding framework, even with the proposed changes,
reveals that a simple and basic management tool is lacking
in the process. There is no method of systematically prior-
itizing any of the dredging projects under consideration.
The traditional interpretation of Article 1, section 9 of
the Constitution has ensured that they are each considered
on a case by case basis [Ref. 1: p. 26]. One purpose of this
study will be to formulate such a methodology based solely
on the cost-benefit relationships of the expanded U.S.




III. EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE MAEIO LOADING METHODS FOR
U.S. EXPORT COAL
A. PREFACE
The U.S. government's role in port development has
traditionally revolved around the central issae of harbor
and channel dredging. If performance of this role is meas-
ured fcy the amount of time between need identification and
the finished product, the federal government has not carried
out its responsibility adequately [ Ref . 15: p-9]. If
performance were based on policy coherence and an ability to
prioritize projects, the federal government appears to have
been singularly unsuccessful in enacting an effective port
development planning and management mechanism [Ref. 18:
p.94]. The Deepwater Port Act (197U) was a first step in
establishing a rudimentary framework for the development of
alternatives to the typical 35* deep East and Gulf Coast
ports. It was, however, quite commodity-specific since it
was in direct response to a perceived need in the early 70's
for deepwater terminals in the U.S. to support the super-
tanker trade in the oil industry [Refs. 18: p. 94;
12: Ch* U].
By contrast, the Japanese and Western European govern-
ments have not had the luxury of adopting such a narrow and
ineffective view. In those nations a framework apparently
exists for port development planning which extends from the
local to the national level, with the cen-^ral government
providing the focal point for leadership. They have demon-
strated an integrated process in which all interests have an
opportunity for representation at the proper level and, most
importantly, in the proper perspective [Ref. 18: p. 93].
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The issiie of port development, whether it be in response
to oil or to coal, has traditionally pitted the economists
against the environmentalists. As Bragaw , et al, point
out in The Chal lenge of De epwater Ports, this view, while
comforting to some from the standpoint of determining who is
"us" and who is "them", is far too simplistic. Bragaw»s
work speaks almost exclusively to the port issue as it
related to imported oil in the middle 70's, Much of the
analysis and many of the arguments concerning the port
development issue then, continue to have direct application
in analyzing the policy alternatives available for the
expansion of marine loading terminals to accommodate rising
demand for 0. S. coal exports.
Bragaw points to three areas where deepwater terminal
development policy is either open to undue manipulation or
is just poorly defined. The first of these, and perhaps the
most obvious, is the environmental hazard posed by any major
change in the environment. Be it the displacement of
millions of cubic yards of mud to dredge a channel, the
selection of a large ground area for the storage of coal
prior tc shipment, or the construction of an offshore
terminal, buoy or an island, some impact on the environment
is inevitable as the result of a large marine construction
project. The difficult *ask is to assess the magnitude of
the impact. Historically, the environmental lobbies have
been highly organized and very effective at creating
"no-win" policy confrontations with either business or the
government over large scale projects by using the media to
create an "all or nothing" image on each issue. Moreover,
they have been successful at adapting their cause to make it




A second area affecting the future of deepwater ports
and terminals is the lack cf a broad legislative framework
with which to define and administer proposed projects
[Ref- 18: p. 75]. No legal structure currently exists which
comprehensively addresses the central issues of terminal
siting, liability, or ownership for offshore marine terminal
proposals. According to Bragaw, several states have passed
stopgap legislation aimed at delaying any construction of
this kind. These laws, however, are nearly all products of
lobbying efforts by coalitions of local and national level
environmentalists and local opposition factions aimed at
impeding development. They are not symmetric legislative
products, proportionately representing all views. This
minimizes their effectiveness in serving the broad interests
of the electorate of each state [Ref. 18: p. 77].
Several attempts to legislate broad policy guidelines in
marine development have been made at the national level.
The Coastal Zone Act (1972) encouraged the states to estab-
lish a general framework for the management of the coastal
zone under their jurisdiction. Unfortunately, this juris-
diction itself is fragmented and not clearly defined. The
impact of this legislation has been limited as a conse-
guence. Another Congressional initiative in this general
area was the Deep Water Port Act (1974). This piece of
legislation was a commodity specific issue, providing the
aegis under which an offshore oil terminal could be
constructed on the Gulf Coast. The law, however, which has
had the single most pervasive and inhibiting effect on port
development is the National Environmental Protection Act
(1969) whose broad generalities concerning the quality of
the environment and extensive impact reporting requirements
have formed the basis of an unending series of li-cigations
in the marine development area.
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In summary, no comprehensive legislative policy or
section of the U.S. Code has been enacted by Congress to
bring clarity to the issue. In the absence of such a legal
structure, it is hardly surprising that no administrative
mechanism or organization exists within the executive branch
whose broad authority might lend coherence to marine devel-
opment issues.
A third inhibition to rapid development of offshore
sites can be termed the socio-economic factor [Ref. 18:
p. 85]. Stated plainly, people don't want their way of life
disrupted. The average citizen in a potentially affected
area does not fear the environmental impact nearly as much
as he simply resists the changes which the siting of such a
superport in his area might bring about [Ref. 18: p. 74].
In addition to the three factors discussed by Bragaw, a
fourth factor has become increasingly important in port
development considerations: financing. The torpor of the
world economy, which has most recently been described as a
recession by the more optimistic of commentators, coupled
with an unprecedented increase in the cost of capital in the
O.S. has had a depressing effect on the number of investors
interested in a development venture. High interest rates,
necessitating a high rate of return, have made traditionally
good long term investments appear impractical. Investment
prospects are dimmed even further by the current strength of
the dollar in the world market. This has made U.S. exports
increasingly expensive and foreign demand has consequently
softened. The net result is that it is becoming increas-
ingly difficult, if not impossible, to make the prices of
commodities shipped from new terminals competitive. Renewed




The political, social and economic forces described
above are at work in policy determination at all levels of
government. Appreciating that these forces form a complex
pattern against which to match an evaluation, it is never-
theless important to establish a common and straightforward
set of measures and outcomes as a first step towards placing
a policy choice in proper perspective. The remainder of
this chapter will be devoted to establishing a framework
which can be used in evaluating the alternatives, describing
the policy alternatives individually, and reaching basic
conclusions concerning these options. In performing a first
level of evaluation concerning coal terminal choices, a
conventional cost-benefit method of balancing measures of
cost against measures of effectiveness is used. Each alter-
native is assumed to be able to accommodate vessels with a
55 foot draft.
The measure of cost is budget outlay adjusted to 1982
dollars. Dredging cost adjustments have been made using
figures obtained from the .Maritime Administration for annual
average costs nationwide to dredge one cubic yard.
Adjustments to marine construction costs are derived from
annual indices compiled by the Engineering News Review for
heavy construction costs throughout the U.S. Regional vari-
ations from the national average were not used.
Effectiveness for this analysis is measured by the risk
of failure and/or damage to the environment associated with
each policy choice. Stated simply, it is the degree of
uncertainty that a choice, once made, will be successful.
The four measures of effectiveness deemed pertinent to this
evaluation roughly parallel (with the exception of tech-
nology) the forces at work in the policy making environment
discussed in section A. above:
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Technological risk: The probability that the project
under consideration can be successfully undertaken
from a technical standpoint. It is an assessment
based upon a search of available literature concerning
the generalized technology involved and interviews
with experienced people in the field. This risk will
be assigned values of low, medium or high.
Economic risk: The degree to which the investment will
provide a service and product with a ready demand in
the marketplace. This demand is assumed to provide
the climate and opportunity for obtaining the rate of
return necessary zo make the investment feasible.
Demand in this context is viewed in two ways: first,
that the product is competitively priced and thus
occupies a position in the vicinity of the equilibrium
point in the supply and demand structure; second, that
the resultant product is attractive to the market-
place. For example, if the least cost method is to
produce slurry and haul this in tankers, and this
alternative is low in technological, environmental and
political risks, the fact that there is no demand for
such a product in the international marketplace makes
this alternative non-viable from an economic stand-
point. In assessing risk in this area, the amount of
time necessary to bring the project to completion is
also considered. Risk is assigned based upon a review
of available coal industry literature, comparison with
other commercial projections and interviews with
personnel representing the coal industry, individual
port authorities, port development analysts and
employees of the federal government. The risk is
assigned values of low (ready demand), medium or high
(little or no demand) .
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3. Environmental ris)c: The probability that the project
construction or the leading process itself will have a
permanent adverse impact on the environment. This
assessment is based on a review of available litera-
ture and interviews with industry and government
employees. Qnlike the others considered, this partic-
ular risk is external to the structure of the alterna-
tive itself. While a project may be low in cost,
highly profitable and politically feasible, its effect
on an unrelated industry or ecological area may be
significant and must be considered. This risk is
assigned values of low, medium or high.
4. Political risk: The probability that the project will
be rejected by either the government or commerce. It
is based on a review of the available literature
concerning current Congressional activity on this
issue, past performance on the issue of deepwater
ports for oil imports, the statements of the Reagan
Administration concerning the funding of public works
in 'general (marine construction in particular) and
personal estimates made by several experts on the
issue from the federal government, port aurhorities
and private industry. This risk is assigned values of
low, medium or high.
The criterion to be used in this evaluation of the
alternatives is not complex. It is simply to determine
which investment is associated with the least risk for the
project's cost, i.e. risk averse priorization with project
cost being considered secondarily. The next stage is to
prioritize any set of existing subalternatives to yield
maximum capacity for a given cost ceiling.
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C. ALTERNATIVE LOADING METHODS
1 • Offshore Islands
a. Description
An alternative initially raised during the oil
superport debate of the middle 1970* s was the construction
of offshore artificial sea islands which could act as tran-
shipment points able to handle ships up to 250,000 dwt. An
example of such a proposal for oil was advocated by Soros
Associates in 1972 [Ref. 18: p.U9]- An island of 500 acres
would be constructed with 8 deep draft berths and 13 shallow
draft or feeder berths. In order to modify this proposal to
handle 100 million tons of coal per year, the size of the
island would have to be increased for the additional area
required for ground storage and loading equipment.
b. Cost
Approximately $1.52 billion for construction
costs and an additional $13 U, 7 million in annual operations
and maintenance costs are estimated [Ref- 19: p.2U9]. The
construction costs are those proposed by Soros Associates
and adjusted to 1982 dollars. The operations and mainte-
nance cost is derived from a composite cost model originally
developed by William E. Turcotte, Chairman, Department of
Management, U.S. Naval War College, while conducring
research on the oil issue at the Maritime Administration
during the same period of time in which the Soros' proposal
was developed. These amounts are probably lower than the
actual costs of a "coal" island, but the difference could
not be calculated since neither has ever been built. The





The technological risk associated with this
project is evaluated as high based on the sheer size of the
project and the difficulties experienced in building smaller
islands as oil drilling platforms in the Beaufort Sea.
d. Economic risk
This risk area is evaluated as high based on the
absence of any current plans for such a system of tranship-
ment in the private sector and a construction time of eight
years. Moreover, creation of such a terminal would have an
adverse effect on the geographically separated marine termi-
nals in existence or planned for by 1990 and the existing
rail transportation system. The activity level of such a
large single purpose terminal, dedicated to a single
commodity, will be subject to market fluctuations on a far
larger scale than its multi-purpose port counterpart. In
sum, it is doubtful whether the cost of transhipment coupled
with the rate of return needed on such a project would be
offset ty the reduction in ocean freight rates in a manner
which would result in U.S. export coal being comperitively
priced regardless of throughput. This is illustrated with
the following example. The amortization of a $1.52 billion
construction cost might range from $203 million per year at
12 percent over a 20 year period to $23 1 million per year at
15 percent over 30 years. Add to these amounts the $135
million annual operating cost plus a $2.00 per ton tranship-
ment cost (drawn from figures produced by WOCOL) . This
means that each ton of coal handled in this 100 million ton
per year facility, will carry a surcharge of $5.38 to $5.66.
When this is contrasted with the $1.25 per ton savings in
freight costs when using a 150,000 dwt collier in place of a
50,000 dwt vessel on the same 7000 mile round trip (see
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Figure 2.1) , it is quickly concluded that the benefit of
being able to use the large collier is overshadowed by the
additional cost burden to be assumed if this alternative is
selected.
€. Environmental risk
This risk is evaluated as high since construc-
tion of a large artificial structure such as a sea island
would obliterate a portion of the ocean bed at least the
size of the island,
...not to mention the peripheral destruction
around the base of the island structure due to
heavy silting and disturbed sedimentation. The
tack and forth traffic required to transport and
deposit the building materials would disrupt
normal ecological activity in the water column and
on the ocean floor beneath the travelled routes.
Finally, given that conventional practices would
be used and/or dredging activity in inland and
coastal waters would result in massive environ-
mental destruction and degradation.
[Ref. 18: p. 63]
f. Political risk
Politically, the risk associated with the alter-
native is evaluated as high based on the geographic singu-
larity of the proposal and the adverse effect its operation
would have on the existing commercial infrastructure. As
noted earlier in this chapter, the above risk is further
compounded by the lack of legal or regulatory mechanisms
with which to control such a project.
2. Slurry Pipelines; Shore Site to Offshore L oad ing
3UOJS
a. Description
This alternative, as well as the next one, as
individual projects do not provide the full capacity needed
to satisfy the overall export requirements projected for the
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year 2000. They are viewed instead, as cocaplementary to
other larger scale efforts to increase capacity. Moreover,
they are aimed specifically at satisfying the demands of the
super collier trade between now and the early 1990s.
Slurry technology, the process of placing parti-
cles of a commodity in a liquid medium and transport.ing them
hydraulically through pipelines, is one that was developed
in the last few years of the 19th century. Until now, it
has gained no commercial popularity, with only one pipeline
system in the nation operating in the Southwest. The prin-
cipal inhibitors to the expansion of the coal slurry
industry in the U.S. have been the existing railway system
with its low freight rates and natural reluctance to provide
rights of way or eminent domain to slurry supporters and the
difficulties in deliguifying the coal once it has reached
its destination. Technology has progressed to -he point
where it is now considered feasible to pump slurried coal
through a pipe to a buoy loading terminal in deepwater onto
a specially configured collier or reconfigured tanker. This
ship performs the dewatering (separation of the coal from
the water) and returns this slurry water to the pumping
station ashore for recycling. The offshore portion of this
system consists of a Single Point Mooring (SPM) buoy
supplied by a submarine pipeline. The SPM could be located
as far as 18 to 20 miles offshore depending on undersea
topography.
A slurry pipeline system such as the one
proposed by Wheelabrator-Fr ye of New Hampshire, which avoids
the issues of eminent domain and environmental hazards
(described under the next alternative) which have plagued
inland pipeline efforts, seems to be a representative and
realistic example of what might be accomplished in this area
[Ref. 20]- Summarizing this plan, offshore terminals are
U8

being - considered for as yet to be selected locations on the
East and Gulf coasts: North Carolina and Alabama. Coal
would be transported to near shore ground storage by conven-
tional means. The coal would be slurried at that site, then
pumped to an SPM and delivered to a 1U0,000 dwt collier in
much the same way as oil is loaded and unloaded at the more
than 100 SPM petroleum terminals worldwide. After dewa-
tering aboard ship the coal would be delivered dry to its
destination. Initial capacity would be 4 to 5 million tons
per year with the potential to expand to 16.5 million tons
per year per SPM location.
An alternative, but less attractive proposal
would prcvide for slurry load and slurry unload of xhe coal
from a larger class of ship in the 250,000 dwt category
using the same SPM system. The unat tractiveness of this
proposal lies in the lack of a current or projected market
for slurried coal in suspension.
A key feature of the Mheelabrator-Frye proposal
as stated in the project description and reiterated by the
project manager is that government funding is not sought.
The investment is to come entirely from the private sector.
The role of the federal government is anticipated to be in
the area of regulatory and administrative mechanisms which
will speed up the permitting process.
b. Cost
While Wheelabr atcr-Frye does not seek any
federal funding at present, the costs of the project will be
included in the alternative evaluation process as a aeneral-
ized example. The Wheela brator-Fry e project manager for
this slurry terminal proposal estimates the cost of this
project between $200 and $250 million per location. This
figure does not include the price for the special
H9

reconfiguration of the ships designed to load and dewater
the slurry, then transport the coal abroad. Four ships per
SPM location are estimated by Wheelabrator-Frye as necessary
to adequately support each buoy location. The cost for the
conversion of all four colliers is estimated to be no more
than $35 million. This sum notwithstanding, this project
appears to compare favorably with the only large scale
offshore petroleum unloading buoy system which is situated
off the Louisiana coast. This site opened in May 1981 af-er
seven years of permitting and political negotiation, three
years of actual construction, and a cost of $773.5 million
[Ref. 21].
Annual operating and maintenance costs for this
coal terminal alternative are difficult to calculate since a
similar project has never been undertaken. Borrowing once
again from the petroleum industry, some gross approximation
of these costs can be determined from a study conducted by
Raytheon Company in 1 974 [Ref. 22: p. 83] and Professor
Turcotte's previously referred to work. The annualized
costs associated with the operation and maintenance of a
petroleum SPM are $29 million. Considering the more labor
intensive nature of coal transportation and yard operations,
$29 million per year can probably be considered as the very
least such operations would cost. The cost of slurry water
in a recycling pipeline of this length is inconsequential.
The cost of rail transportation for the coal is not
included.
c- Technological Risk
The risk assessed for this project is medium
based on the success of the offshore oil superport in
Louisiana, but offset by the unproven feability of the dewa-
ter ing facilities aboard the specially configured colliers




The economic risk is assessed as medium to high.
The entire project is dedicated to the movement of a single
commodity. Continued slackness in coal demand, either as a
result of continued lower crude oil prices or increases in
the use of nuclear power in electricity generation will have
a more adverse effect on this single purpose port project
than it would have on a conventional multi-purpose port.
This is offset by the relative speed, four years, needed to
put such a marine terminal into operation. As of March
1982, no definite commitments either by the coal industry or
by Wheelabrator-Frye existed for the start of this partic-
ular terminal option.
e. Environmental Risk
The risk attributed to the undertaking of this
project is low. . Coal is relatively inert in salt water so
that a rupture in the submarine pipe would not, it is esti-
mated, represent a grave and lasting threat to the environ-
ment. A question traditionally raised by environmentalists
in discussing slurry pipelines for inland use has been the
enormous amount of water required to keep the system oper-
ating. This particular proposal for a short offshore slurry
pipeline avoids such an issue by recycling the water from
the collier back to shore analogous to a liquid conveyer
belt. This water could, theoretically, be used indefinitely
with replacement required only for the water remaining on
the coal after dewatering (6-8 percent by weight). To place
this in context, a 16,5 million ton per year facility would
undergo a net loss of approximately 283 million gallons or
roughly 20 percent of the yearly consumption of a small city
such as Monterey, Ca. (population less than 30,000 with no
heavy industry), according to figures provided by the




The political risk attributed to this alterna-
tive is medium. This particular proposal avoids all of the
controversy concerning eminent domain encountered by inland
slurry pipeline advocates since it uses conventional trans-
portation to the near shore staging point. As noted earlier
in the chapter, the uncertainty associated with the lack of
a legislative and administrative framework within which to
develop and operate this proposed offshore facility detracts
from its attractiveness to investors. It is important to
recognize that this project will meet near term surges in
coal demand because it can be built so quickly. It comple-
ments longer term more efficient solutions which provide
more capacity for the investment dollar.
3- Coal Slurry Pipeli ne: Mine Head to Offshore Loading
Buoy
a. Description
This alternative is an extension of the previous
alternative. Coal would be slurried at the minehead or soma
central location in the coal fields and then transported in
a conventional slurry pipeline to the coast then by subma-
rine pipeline to an offshore SPM for loading and dewatering
on board the colliers. An example of such a system is the
Pacific Eulk Commodity Transportation System. This proposal
was the result of a Maritime Administration sponsored feasi-
bility study to move 10 million tons of coal per year from
Emery, Utah to offshore loading buoys located off Port
Hueneme on the southern coast of California, a distance of




The approximate construction cost of rhis
project is $58U million [Ref. 2U: p. 93]- The annual oper-
ating and maintenance cost of a pipeline-buoy loader of this
length using water recycling are estimated to be $79 million
(for pipeline operations, water and buoy terminal mainte-
nance) [adapted froa Bef. 25: p. 98 and information provided
by the Maritime Administration]. Unlike the previous alter-
native, these annual costs do include the transportation of
the coal. Slurry advocates claim that coal can be trans-
ported overland more economically by pipeline than by rail.
Lack of empirical data other than that from the single oper-
ational slurry pipeline in the U.S. (Black Mesa), however,
leaves this claim largely unsubstaniated. It is assumed
that four collier conversions will be required to service
each location. Being a Maritime Administration sponsored
study, these ships would presumably be U.S. flag carriers.
Since there are no large colliers currently in the U.S.
inventory, the study included an adjusted cost of $331
million for the construction of colliers specifically
designed for this task. This contrasts sharply with the
previous alternative's cost for ship conversion since the
former relies on conversion of existing large colliers in
foreign fleets rather than new construction.
c. Technological Risk
The technological risk for this proposal is
assessed as medium. The inland portion of the slurry pipe-
line is low risk as evidenced by the smooth and nearly unin-
terrupted service of the only operational coal slurry
pipeline in the U.S., "he 274 mile Black Mesa line in the
Southwest. The imponderables remain, as in the last alter-





The economic risk assessed for this proposal is
assessed as high- It has all the risk elements of the last
alternative, but with a much higher capital outlay. Ten
million tons of capacity are produced for an investment of
$584 million which does not compare favorably with
Wheelabrator-Frye»s proposal of 16-5 million tons for a $250
million investment- Since the inland and offshore portions
of this transportation system could be constructed simulta-
neously, the amount of time necessary to to bring this
alternative into operation is not thought to be much
greater than the four years estimated for the last alterna-
tive, once rhe issues of eminent domain and permitting are
resolved- While several conventional slurry pipeline
delivery systems designed to supply domestic utilities are
in varying stages of development by private sector enter-
prises [Ref. 26], there are apparently no commerical backers
for this particular one.
e- Environmental R isk
The risk to the environmen-^ posed by this
proposal is assessed as low based on the rationale given for
the previous slurry pipeline and the apparent lack of any
substantial environmental hazard regarding the use of large
guantities of water from the interior since this system is
also designed to recycle the water used [Ref. 26: p. 27],
Moreover, the excellent record established over a period of
years by the 3lack Mesa pipeline suggests that the inland





The political risk for this slurry proposal is
assessed as high. Two major issues, the availability of
water for the pipeline in the arid coal fields of Utah and
the risk of pollution by this method of coal transportation,
appear to have no real basis in fact [ Ref s. 23; 2U; 26].
They are, however, issues which environmentalists and other
local opposition can easily capitalize on and use litigation
to delay development efforts.
The true high risks in this proposal involve the
issue of eminent domain and the staunch opposition of the
railroads. Eminent domain, the right of a public utility or
public project to claim land along a right of way is a right
which has thus far eluded the slurry lobby at the national
level, although favorable legislation has been passed by
several Western states. Several bills pertaining to this
subject have been defeated in Congress through the late
1970' s, and the prospects for early resolution in that arena
remain dim [Ref- 24-: p. 95]. The railroad lobby has effec-
tively opposed the granting of the right of eminent domain
to the pipeline interests. The railroad's rationale is
tripartite: existing rail and barge transportation capacity
is sufficent to meet future needs; the pipelines will have a
severely disruptive effect on future railroad operations;
and since slurry pipelines need long term contracts with
users to make the projects feasible, they restrain free
trade and competition. Even the GAO comments
[Ref. 23: p. 12], that "Most sources agree that... there does
not appear to be a transportation shortage problem in terns
of coal movement by rail at this time or in the foreseeable
future.
"
While certain selected domestic pipelines,
particularly the project promoted by Energy Transport
55

Systems Inc. (ETSI) , stand a good chance of completion, the
overall political case for regular use of pipelines to move
export coal is not strong in a political or sociological
context [Ref. 24: p. 95]. The final and perhaps ultimate
political issue concerning this alternative is that there is
apparently no interest in the private sector for this type
of export project. Any investment by the federal government
in this type of transportation system would place it in
direct competition with the private sector's existing coal
transport system and the state or municipal ports that
currently do the coal loading. In addition to the obvious
disruption which this project would have en a regional coal
chain, it appears to be in direct contradiction to the
current Administration's political philosophy concerning the
role which the federal government should play in the U.S.
economy.
U . No Po rt Improvemen t Acti ons
a. Cost
While there is no investment cost associated
with this policy choice, the opportunity cosx is very high.
Industry estimates project an aggregate loss of as much as
$8 billion per year in U.S. balance of payments by the year
2000 [ adapted from data contained in Ref 2: p. 512 ] This
figure is based on a projected leveling off of total coal
exports from the U.S. at 12 5 million tons per year resulting
from the nation's inability to offer a full spectrum of
competitive prices. This will come as result of U.S. ports
being unable to accommodate colliers larger than PANAJ1AX
size due to channel depth limitations. The exceptions to
this will in all likelihood be the ports of Long Beach, Ca.
and Los Angeles, Ca . since both these ports already have
deep water and are planning additional coal handling
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The economic risk in choosing this alternative
is assessed as high when viewed from the perspective of lost
trade and opportunity costs. As noted by Carl Bagge,
President of the National Coal Association, the industry's
principal trade and lobbying organization, at a September
198 1 port conference,
"Witii every $15 billion increase in sales of
American manufacturing products abroad, the use of
domestic goods increases by $22 billion. In turn,
this creates about one million jobs, adds $38
billion to the GNP, stimulates $4 billion of new
investment, and adds $12 billion in new tax
receipts," [Ref- 27]
Annual U.S. foreign exchange earnings from coal are
predicted to rise an additional $12.5 to $16.5 billion by
the year 2000 based on .a current price of $50 per ton
[Ref, 2: p,433]. Thus the amount of benefits mentioned by
Mr. Bagge will become the opportunity costs or benefits




The political risk is estimated as medium
because the high opportunity cost of this alternative has a
passive yet adverse impact on the growth of an important
segment of the national economy and therefore a direct
influence on the political viability of the choice.
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5. Inland Waterway 11212X9 me nts to Su^rlj^ a Mississippi
Superport
a. Description
Marshalling the vast transportation resources of
the Mississippi Basin, both rail and barge, this alternative
proposes the use of the lower Mississippi River as a coal
superport. Like the first alternative, it seeks to meet the
projected shortfall in coal export capacity through a single
massive project. This proposal would take advantage of the
central location of the Mississippi River and its tribu-
taries to export coal from Appalachian, Mid-Western and
Western coal fields from a single point. For the purpose of
this analysis, capacity at this port is assumed to be 100
million tons per year.
b. Cost
Selection of this alternative would necessitate
upgrading and repair of key portions of the inland waterway
at a cost of approximately $773.5 million [ Ref . 28: p,32].
The cost to dredge the portion of the Mississippi river to
accommodate large colliers is estimated to be in the neigh-
borhood of $489 million. [Ref. 29: p«19]. Overall project
cost totals $1,262 billion.
c. Technological Risk
The risk assessed is low since it uses conven-
tional and proven technology in all aspects of development.
d. Economic Risk
The risk inherent in this proposal is assessed
as high, based on the long leadtime necessary for project
completion. Refurbishment of the inland waterway is
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estimated to take 20 years, while dredging of the lower
Mississippi River could be complete five years after the
permitting process is completed. It is felt that this delay
would have as severe an inhibiting effect on the U.S. being
able to meet increases in the near term demand for steam
coal as doing nothing at all.
e. Environmental Risk
Risk in this area is also assessed as lew to
medium, A full discussion of the possible environmental
impact of extensive dredging as would have to be done in the
lower Mississippi River is contained in the subsection on
selective port dredging presented below.
f. Political Risk
The political risk in choosing this alternative
is assessed as high. The economies of scale resulting from
the ability to accommodate colliers up to 150,000 dwt and
the concentration of coal loading resources in one area,
would be offset by the major disruption such a policy would
have on a large segment of the existing ccal export infra-
structure. The rail networks carrying coal to both East and
West coasts which are beginning to approach capacity would
become vastly underutilized. Congestion on the Mississippi
River would greatly increase. Other existing ports, partic-
ularly Mobile, would feel a distinct and lasting adverse
impact. To place a disproportionate share, roughly one-
half, cf what may turn out to be the United States' largest
commodity export by 2000 in a single region does net appear
to be balanced politically. In all likelihood T.he choice to




6 - Sapport Dre d^ ing in Sel ected Ports
a. Description
Support of dredging in selected U.S. ports would
require the federal government's commitment to two courses
of action. The first is to fund a capital outlay, in whole
or in part, for the dredging of selected coal ports in the
U.S. to accommodate colliers up to 150,000 dwt. The process
of selecting which ports is the subject of Chapter IV. The
second requirement is to streamline the permitting process
so that the dredging projects themselves will be more
responsive to the nation's needs. Shortening this process
will have the additional benefit of spurring private sector
investment in the coal terminals themselves since the
present value of rhe investment will rise as the return on
the investment will begin sooner.
b. Costs
The total cost of this program to the federal
government is variable depending upon which port is selected
(a function of where the best and strongest private sector
commitments to the expansion of pierside coal handling
facilities reside), the availability of funds, and the
portion of the dredging cost which the federal government
will bear. Some representative cost figures are as follows:
Hampton Roads: $442 million,
Baltimore: $375 million.
New York City: $165 million,
Philadelphia: $3.5 billion,
Morehead City, N.C. : $18 million.
Mobile: $462 million, and
New Orleans/Baton Rouge: $489 million- [ Refs. 28 and 29]
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To place these figures into the context of the
federal budget currently being debated, Hampton Roads,
Baltimore, New York City, Mobile and New Orleans can all be
dredged for less than two billion dollars. This sum repre-
sents five percent of the annual federal public works expen-
ditures which amount to almost $40 billion [ Ref . 30: p-23],
absent from this list and of significant note
when considering the coal industry in the western O.S. are
the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, Both ports are
already able to accommodate tankers up to 100,000 dwt. A
fledgling coal export trade in the neighborhood of one
million tons per year per port has developed. Both cities
have ambitious plans for the expansion of this trade with
Long Beach preparing for 15 million tons per year by 1985
and 30 million tons per year by 1990. Los Angeles is plan-
ning on expansion to 10 to 15 million tons per year by 1990.
Annual maintenance costs for these expanded
channels will increase over their current levels. While
these costs will vary depending on the port selected, it is,
for example, estimated that if Hampton Roads, Baltimore,
Mobile and New Orleans were selected for dredging, annual
maintenance costs would increase by $88 million [Ref. 28:
P-31]-
c. Technological Risk
Port dredging is a proven technology. Risk in
this area is assessed as low.
d. Economic Risk
The economic risk of this alternative is
assessed as low. Market fluctuations notwithstanding,
future demand for coal will almost surely grow signifi-
cantly. The ability to offer at least one deepwater port on
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each coast will increase the coal industry's ability to
respond to different demands from users worldwide. The
economic advantage of the deepwater port is not limited to
coal. Any export commodity which lends itself to bulk ship-
ment will enjoy a similiar advantage. Coal, predicted as
the largest export commodity (in terms of balance of
payments) by the end of the century can be seen in this
context as a catalyst to bring about needed changes.
Project completion time is variable based on which ports are
selected for dredging and what inroads can be made in expe-
diting the permitting process.
e. Environmental Risk
The risk to the environment posed by the selec-
tion of this alternative is assessed as low to medium.
Substanial controversy exists over disposal of the sludge
and other debris which would result from a large dredging
project. Two basic options exist: displace the sludge to
deeper water offshore or use it as landfill in land reclama-
tion. The latter course of action if carried out within the
environs of the dredged port itself appears to have less
potential impact than the dumping of vast quantities of
tidelands mud offshore in a deepwater environment.
A second area of risk associated with this
alternative is the effect which the dredging process itself
may pose to the environment. Most of the ports in the U.S.
are industrial centers. Prior to the beginning of public
awareness of environmental and pollution concerns in the
1960»s, vast quantities of highly toxic industrial waste was
dumped into rivers which run to the ports and into the
waters of the ports themselves. Much of this ma-erial has
settled in the harbor bottoms and been covered by subsequent
alluvial deposits, thus removing the toxins from direct
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contact with local marine life forms. The act of dredging
in and of itself may disturb some of these deposits located
beneath the proposed channels and release these substances
into the waters of the harbors once again.
f. Political Risk
This alternative is assessed as having low risk.
It is popular with the private sector. Political contro-
versy over which ports to dredge is inevitable, but because
this program is widely distributed geographically and incre-
mental over time, the bargaining process which drives both
the legislative and executive branches will be able to
operate to minimize much of the disagreement.
D. CONCLUSION
A summary of the evaluation is contained in Table V.
Certain qualitative differences exist between the alterna-
tives. First, alternatives two and three in their present
form only provide part of the additional capacity required.
Second, the cost of alternative two is not a cost to the
federal government. Finally, the cost of no action is an
opportunity cost not an outlay of funds, and must be viewed
in a different light than the other costs.
Applying the criterion selected at the beginning of this
chapter, that of minimizing risk with cost being a secondary
factor, indicates support for two alternatives: a slurry-
pipeline from a near-shore staging point to an offshore
loading buoy and selective port dredging for East and Gulf
coast ports. Neither program entails unacceptable risk and
both complement and support the existing coal industry
infrastructure.
Support of an offshore buoy system, such as -he one




Deepwater Terminal Evaluation Summary
Add*l Cost Technology Economy Environment Political
Capacity ($a) Risk Risk Risk Risk
(MT)
Sea
Island 100 1500 H H H H
Shore-
Ship
Slurry 16.5 250 M M-H L M
Overland-
Ship
Slurry 10 584 M H L H
No
Action 8000 None H None M
Wat erway
Upgrade 100 1262.5 L H L-M H
Selective .75- 9-
Dredging 152.7 2725.5 L L L-M L
federal funds. Instead, cost is in the form of support to
establish a definitive and expedited permitting process
which will assist entrepreneurs in attracting capital to
fund the project and bring it into operation at an early
date. It is both a near term solution and a complementary
measure to more efficient long term initiatives since it
will fill a gap in export capacity which is predicted for
the mid to late 1980' s [ Ref . 20: p. 13 ], before expanded port
facilities which it will complement become available.
Support of the above alternative is insufficient in the
long term. The dredging of selected ports, funded at least
partially by the federal government, and developed under a
new set of expedited permitting guidelines is also required
if any credence is lent to the overwhelming body of evidence
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presented by academic, industry, and government studies that
the expert steam coal trade will increase greatly by the
year 2000, The U.S. must be prepared to meet the demand.
This program is incremental both in time and the selection
of projects, thus it is the single course of funding action
which remains viable in an environment of budget ceiling
uncertainty. Moreover, being geographically separated, thus
giving wider distribution to the benefits accrued, it repre-
sents the most politically attractive course of action from
the stand point of actually achieving agreement in Congress.
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IV- A jJODEL FOE PRIORITIZATION OF POR;^ DEVELOPMENT
The process for the selection of ports for dredging to
improve import/export throughput has, historically, been a
highly political process. In contrast, the model presented
in this chapter depoliticiz es the prioritization process for
dredging projects. The results of this systematic selection
scheme could be used as a framework for the more complex
political bargaining process which will yield a final policy
decision. Selection is based on the level of federal
funding available and the total (national) increase in
export capacity. While this model is specific for coal, it
can, with little modification be expanded to other bulk
commodities and be made to integrate the different
commodities' prioritization schemes to aid in determining
total port development requirements.
To function correctly, all ports under consideration
must be included in the model. A reduced sample has been
chosen as an example of the process. Seven coal ports have
been selected for consideration: Hampton Roads, Baltimore,
New York City, Philadelphia, Morehead City, Mobile and New
Orleans/Baton Rouge. The overall cost of coal shipped from
Gulf coast ports is competitive with the cost at East coast
ports. Mobile and New Orleans, for example, are closer to
the Japanese markets than, say, Hampton Roads. Conversely,
coal can be delivered by barge to these ports more cheaply
than corresponding rail transport required further north.
This lower cost on the inland link of the coal transport
chain compensates for the slightly higher ocean freight
rates from the southern ports to the European markets than
those enjoyed by their East coast counterparts. The
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necessary input data such as capacities (existing and
potential) and costs were determined or computed and a
selection of dredging projects for various budget ceilings
was made. While the data used is current, no specific
conclusions can be drawn from the porx projects selected in
this case since a small sample was used and not all the
ports competing were considered for this example.
The actual choice of which ports to dredge should not be
made en the basis of finances alone. A prioritization based
on efficiency, as this one is, acts as an excellent
foundation upon which to overlay the socio-economic and
political factors that must also be considered before the
final decision is made.
This model considers a port's current coal export
capacity, proposed projects which will expand the capacity
of that port, the likelihood that those projects will be
completed, and the share (percent) of the dredging cost
which the port is willing to assume.
A. PRIORITIZATION
The criterion in determining which ports should be
dredged is the gaining of maximum benefit (capacity) for a
given budget ceiling without elaborating for socio-economic
or political factors.
^ • Expected Total Capa city
The current annual coal handling capacity and
proposed improvements/additions which would increase
capacity for each pert were ascertained from a literature
search and from interviews with port authorities. Columns
(1) and (2) of Table VI summarize these data. Certain
ports, particularly the larger ones, have more than one




















































































































o> m CO "^
(N m m "^
o CO <Ni r~-





















(NOin ooo o in *— mo
























T^ 0) (1) M
,-d ^ H O
rH 0) •H
•H M ja 3
j:: O o OJ























rH rO-H 4-> >»
•H MfCU-i M
e id 0) U^
3:s:cn>
c














facilities, Each of these projects has a different sponsor
and is located in a different part of the port. Considering
the vaguaries of commerce and the rapid waxing and waning of
enthusiasm in the marketplace, it is unlikely that all of
these additional projects will be completed, so a menhod to
estimate the most likely future level of port capacity is
ne<5essary. Each of these proposed expansions was rated as
either hard, medium, soft or very soft based on its
likelihood of completion. Reasons for non-completion might
be economic, environmental or regulatory. The assignments
were based on information obtained from the American
Association of Port Authorities and a spokesman for the
Maritime Administration. rhey represent professional
estimates as to the actual commitment of the proposal's
sponsor and the expected economic viability of the project.
They are, of necessity, fluid .assessments which are
obviously subject to shifts in the market demand for export
coal and the cost of capital to a particular developer. An
expected value for new total physical 'capacity for each port
was calculated by assigning, probability values to the
completion ratings and summing the products of each
project's increase in capacity with the probabilty value of
that particular project and the current capacity (Equation
4-1).
n
c^ = c^ ^ 21?: c£ , (4-1)
where: C^ = Expected Total Capacity of the port,
C^ = Current caoacity of the port,
P* = Probability value assigned as the
likelihood that project i will be
completed
,
C* = Additional capacity gained in
completing project i, and
i = Individual project number.
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The probability values used were:
Hard = 1. 00
Medium = .50
Soft = .25
Very Soft = .10
2. Effect of Dredging on Capacity Utilized
Provided contracts can be signed (i.e. U.S. coal is
competitive with other suppliers), it is assumed thar close
to 100 percent of this new physical capacity will be
utilized. Conversely, if U.S. coal is not competitive, for
instance as a result of failure to reduce freight rates as a
consequence of neglected dredging, it is reasonable to
expect that only a fraction of this increased coal loading
capacity will be used in a particular port. In this
example, the penalty or loss as a result of not dredging was
set at 50 percent of the additional capacity planned. The
variable DREGEFF in Appendix D reflects this impact on
utilization. Column (5) of Table VI shows the expected
capacity if no dredging operations are underta)cen.
3- Selection of A Dredging Program
The optimal choice of which ports to dredge, based
on the maximum total capacities of each of the candidates,
is determined for specific budget ceilings ranging from $200
million to the amount of federal funds necessary to fund all
of the projects. A listing of -chese costs is presented on
page 60. The federal share is calculated by subtracting the
portion of the costs that the non-federal agencies are
willing to underwrite from the total cost. For this
example, 50 percent local cost sharing is assumed for all
ports. A review of pending legislation determined that this
50/50 split is an often proposed option, though by keeping
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the actual proporation negotiable, competition to raise
local shares by the ports wanting federal funds for dredging
could be encouraged. All of the possible combinations of
dredging projects were enumerated, computing the total
federal cost and total capacity achieved. Those combina-
tions which result in total costs greater than the given
budget ceiling were eliminated. The last step, selection of
the two programs with the largest total expected capacities,
provides two alternative dredging programs which will
provide the greatest total coal export capacity for a
particular budget ceiling. Table VII shows the optimal and
next best programs for varying budget amounts. Figure 4,1
plots the federal cost versus the total capacity of the
optimal programs for increasing budget ceilings. Of signif-
icance is the discrete nature of the stepped increases in
capacities which are a function of the size and cost of the
individual projects. In this sample, the principle of
diminishing marginal returns is clearly illustrated, with
each increment of spending purchasing fewer tons per dollar.
The return is particularly poor past one billion dollars.
'• Growth Potential Index
If, due to fiscal, time or other resource
constraints, only one of the dredging projects within a
particular program can be undertaJ^en at one time, a
secondary level of prioritization to select the project
which should first receive funding could be found using the
Growth Potential Index (GPI ) . The GPI is the ratio of the
expanded capacity as a result of dredging to the size of the
federal investment. The larger the ratio, the better the
potential for growth. It is calculated by subtracting
column (5) from column (U) of Table VI and then dividing the




Optimal and Next Best Programs for Various Budget Ceilings
New Orleans/Baton rouga
Mobile --------
Mcrehead City - - - - -
Philadelphia -----
New York City - - - - -
Baltimore -------














































































Ffgure 4.1 Federal Cost vs. Total Capacity
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project. Each port's GPI is listed in column (6) of Table
VI. This ranking by GPI is effective as long as a predeter-
mined number of projects has been specified, otherwise the
GPI prioritization may not be optimal. In this case, an
enumeration of all the possible combinations must be used to
determine the necessary priorities.
From the example results contained in Tables VI and
VII, Hampton Roads and More head City, N.C. stand out as the
locations where greatest growth in capacity is achieved for
the dredging dollar invested.
Of additional note, the use of this prioritization
scheme encourages the ports to assume a larger share of the
dredging cost since the smaller federal cost for a partic-
ular capacity, the greater the likelihood that a project
will appear in the selected program. It also increases the
GPI for that particular port.
B. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
1 • Dr edging Ef fe ct Factor
As stated above, if U.S. coal is not competitively
priced in the world market, it is safe to assume that in all
likelihood the additional coal handling capability made
available in a planned expansion will not be used to
capacity in a port not dredged. In other words, dredging
has a direct effect on the portion of the new capaci-y of a
port which will be used on a routine basis. In the example
above, a 50 percent dredging effect factor was used. To
test whether the educated but inexact choice of this factor
does not adversely effect the optimal program selection, the
model was rerun using 10 percent and 90 percent dredging
effect factors. The ten best programs at each budget
ceiling were compared one against the other and again with
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those computed using the original 50 percent factor. While
the total national capacity varied as a result of differing
levels of utilization, in each case the priority list of
possible programs remained the same.
The choice of the dredging effect factor while modi-
fying the capacity utilized had no effect on the selection
of the optimal dredging program for the example analyzed.
2- Cost Shar ing Factor
The percentage of the cost that each local authority
is willing to assume is a factor in the model. In the
example, 50 percent was used for each port. Provided all
ports' percentage are identical this common factor has no
effect on the program prioritization. The federal cost for
each program is proportional to the example model.
The final outcome of legislation designed to estab-
lish the minimum local percentages is not discernible at
this time, although 50 percent seems likely. Regardless of
the final established rate, local authorities may opt to
fund a larger share than they are legally required to bear.
This increase would reduce the federal cost for the same
capacity increase. It may cause that port's dredging
project to be included in the optimal dredging program and
will increase the GPI for that port. The larger GPI impacts
favorably on funding considerations.
For example, if Mobile's share of the dredging costs
could be increased from the previously used 50 percent to 90
percent, while keeping other ports' at 50 percent, then
Mobile's dredging project would appear in the optimal and
the next best programs a- all budget ceilings considered
from the $400 million level to the maximum ceiling. In the
original example. Mobile's project did not appear until the
$1 billion budget ceiling. This increased cost share also
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increased Mobile's GPI from .0238 to .1190, a shift upward
in the GPI prioritization from sixth to second.
Additionally, if each port assumed a greater share
of the cost so that their GPI approximated that of Hampton
Roads in the example (0.14 03), then the total cost to the
federal government to fund all the projects in this sample
would be $546.5 M instead of $2725.5 M. A breakdown of
federal costs per port under this assumption is found in
Table VIII. This manipulation of the GPI illustrates the
level of investment needed by each locale in order to make
it competitive with the base case, Hampton Roads.
TABLE VIII
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The percentage of cost sharing has no effect on the
selection of the optimal dredging program if all ports
assume identical percentages of cost sharing. Only when
differing percentages among the ports are used will the
optimal program selection be affected.
3. Pro bability of Project Completion Factor
The probability weights assigned to the completion
ratings of Hard, Medium, Soft and Very Soft were changed














respectively. While this lid not change the optimal and next
best programs selected at any budget level, the ranking of
lower priority programs did in fact shift. The model was
also run with .90, -75, .60 and .30 as the probability
values. Once again, the top two programs remained the same
while the lower priority programs shifted ranking with the
exception of the $400 million budget ceiling where each of
the top eight programs shifted in priority. This shift of
the lower priority programs at different budget ceiling
levels stresses the need for caution in assigning values to
these weights. For this particular study, the writers
assigned the numerical weights to this project completion
factor assessment. In future, the assessor himself would be
asked to create the numerical scale for the ranking. While
this factor would remain a subjective judgment in an overall
sense, a clearer picture of the differing magnitudes of
degree of commitment between "hard" and "soft" would be
available.
Table IX shows the optimal and next best programs
for the various budget ceilings using the first alternative
weights. As before, Hampton Roads clearly dominates all the
candidates both in terms of its expansion's scope and the








Morehead City - - - - -
Philadelphia -----
New York City - - -
Baltimore -------



























































* No change in optimal or next best solution between$1000M and $2400M.
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V. CONCLUSIONS kWD RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
Overwhelming evidence exists in both the public and
private sectors that the expert of coal from the U.S. will
continue to grow in size and importance as the century draws
to a close. Market fluctuations in oil and coal notwith-
standing, the world's supply of fossil fuel is finite and,
over the long term, increases in value, since no truly
adequate alternative is at hand. Almost inevitably much of
the world must turn to coal as a more abundant and less
costly fuel than oil- The U.S. , as the largest producer and
potential supplier of coal must be adequately prepared to
meet increasing demand in order to reap the full benefits of
a more favorable balance of payments and stronger ties with
other western nations based upon the United States as a
competitive and secure source of energy.
This study grew out of earlier work which focused on the
need for deepening East and Gulf coast ports. In expanding
the research to include the Pacific ports, it was antici-
pated that the prioritization scheme for dredging would
become a large and complex matrix with a large number of
West coast ports in the competition. This did not happen.
First of all, the coal industry in the western region of the
U.S. was found to be very different from its eastern count-
erpart. The latter demonstrates a tight, integrated connec-
tion all the way from the coal fields to the loading piers
at the ports. In the West, the coal industry is still new
and each link in the coal chain is separate and distinct
from every other. The overall impression is one of more
fragility than its more robust eastern cousin.
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More important than the above, though, is the conclusion
that not every port that wants to be part of the coal trade
needs channel depths to 55 feet. The entire trade is not
going tc super colliers. Based on demand projections, port
expansion plans, and the portion of the coal trade antici-
pated to be carried in very large ships, Los Angeles and
Long Beach appear to complement one another in their devel-
opment plans and will accommodate deep draft demand for the
Pacific Rim trade. The balance of this trade will go to
smaller coal ports restricted to servicing PANAMAX size
vessels. A sizeable portion of the szeam coal trade will
remain in this class of ship since many of the destination
ports in the Pacific area are not planning to dredge beyond
their current 35 to 40 feet. The result of the above is
that the guestion of dredging to 55 feet becomes geographi-
cally specific to the East and Gulf coasts. Therefore given
steam coal demand projections through the end of the century
and a budget ceiling, the optimal selection of ports to be
dredged can be made using the model presented in Chapter IV.
Effective satisfaction of this increased overall demand
will be based on a rationalization of the U.S. expert coal
trade tc permit this nation to accommodate the entire spec-
trum of demand. A Icey ingredient is the ability to handle
ships larger than the PANAMAX size at at least one large
coal loading terminal on each coast. With the exceptions of
Los Angeles and Long Beach in California, the remainder of
the a.S. port system will not be able to effectively adapt
to the growing usage of large ships in the bulk trade.
The current state of port and offshore terminal develop-
ment is haphazard, tedious and politically biased. A truly
comprehensive plan for port development and a system to
administer it is not in evidence, nor is it anticipated in
the near term. A framework of planning and control, founded
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or. a solid base of legislation, is required now to avoid
increasingly inefficient port development and the inevitable
cost to the taxpayer both in actual costs and revenues
foregone.
The federal permitting and funding procedures pertaining
to port and offshore development are in need of streamlining
if any solutions, either interim or long term, to the
projected gap between world demand and the loading capa-
bility of the U-S, are to be found. A 25 year cycle is too
long.
If the model in Chapter IV is considered valid, then its
use indicates that the more financial participation a locale
is willing to make in a project, the more attractive the
development of that particular port will appear in the
prioritization process. This is, in fact, in consonance
with the principles of "new federalism" espoused by the
Reagan Administration.
Rationalizing the need for deepwater terminal develop-
ment based upon the economics or lobbying power of a single
commodity, be it coal, oil or grain, will prolong the frag-
mented and parochial views which currently prevail. A
coalition of several interests is needed to ensure that the
selection of ports to be dredged truly serves the national
economy. Without a top down, systemic approach which artic-
ulates goals and methods designed to reach a broad and
balanced economic objective regarding port and offshore
terminal development, much of the benefit predicted for the
O.S. as a result of increased foreign trade in the last
years of this century may be lost. In this context, coal




The prioritization scheme presented in Chapter IV which
treats more than one port at a time and which is ultimately
based on the increased coal export capacity which will
accrue to a particular port if selected for dredging should
be used as an analytical tool in a rational port development
process. While outside the scope of this study, it is
assumed that this general methodology would be applicable to
the study of commodities other than coal in determining a
priority for the development of other commodity specific
terminals. This should be tested.
More complicated, but of greater value in bringing
coherence to the analysis of port development, further
research should be conducted to determine which measures of
effectiveness should be used in performing a generalized,
non-commodity related prioritization for the development of
O.S. ports. While difficult to ascertain, these measures
will provide homogeneity to this multi-faceted process.
Specific legislation and administrative mechanisms in
support of offshore buoy loading system development to meet
a near term gap in export capability are required now. The
permitting and funding process for channel dredging in
selected ports must be placed on a "fast track" basis.
While the coal trade will be one of the mos-c immediate bene-
ficiaries of this action since it would then be able to more
adequately accommodate the ballooniag of demand forecasted
for the mid-1990' s, the entire U.S. bulk trade, import and
export alike, will become more economical and gain a compet-
itive advantage when larger ships can be used.
In 1976 Marcus, £t al
.
, after studying federal port
policy, concluded that, while much needed to be done to
systematize development in this area through centralization,
there was little hope that the diverse bureaucratic factions
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playing roles in port or offshore development could be
brought together into a single bureaucratic entity [Ref. 12:
p,2 19]. Increased cooperation among the many players making
port policy was the only viable recommendation offered at
that time. Much has changed politically and economically
since then. While tangential to the issues analyzed in this
study, it is concluded that the time has come to bring
order, reason and moderation to the port and offshore devel-
opment process by scrapping the traditional interpretation
of that portion of the Constitution purported to deal with
bias and prioritization in port development (but which
really appears to be a 200 year old compromise arrived a-
during the transition of the Articles of Confederation to
the Constitution) and bring this effort into the twentieth
century through the centralization of the planning, regula-
tion and programming functions under the leadership of an
independent agency. This organization should have much the
same power and general organizational characteristics as the
Federal Communications Commission, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, and the Small Business Administration. The
nation can no longer afford the existing ineffective and
costly coalition of managements in this vital area. It is
recommended that further research in the form of cost-ben-
efit and political feasibility studies be undertaken to
determine exactly what actions are necessary to implement





PROJECTED piSTRIBaTION OF S TEAM COAL SHIPMENTS IN TON-MILES
BY SHIP SIZE - (PERCENT)










1980 10 13 22 t*3 88 5 7 - 100
1985 6 7 19 39 71 H 17 8 100
1990 H 6 13 27 50 6 27 17 100
1995 3 5 10 24 42 6 30 22 100
200 2 4 8 21 35 7 33 25 100
Source: "Interim Report of the Interagency Coal Export Task
Force," Draft for Public Comment, U.S. Department of Energy,
January 1981, using as reported from original source of H.P.





SYNOPSIS OF MA^R £2JI DEVELOPMENT LEGISLATION
HOUSE BILLS
I* M 29 59/5 023
a. Description
• Introduced April 1, 198 1 as Administration's
proposal to recover dredging costs for port
improvements.
• Authorizes collection of user fees on traffic
through ports .
b- Status
• Howard and Clavsen introduce administration's
revised proposals as HR 5073,
2« HR it 62 7 Port Development and Navigation I mprovement
Act of liii
a. Description
• Introduced Sept. 30, 1981 by Biaggi (D-NY)
,
co-sponsored by Jones (D-NC) , Hoggs (D-LA) ,
Bevill (D-AL), Breaux (D-LA) , Pritchard
(R-WA) , Tauzin (D-LA), Foglietta (I-PA) ,
Jlilcetlaha (D-MD), and Livingston (R-LA) .
• Reduces to two and one half years the -irae for
Congressional authorization, funding and
construction.
• Federal funding of capital and 05M of channel
depth to 45 feet-
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• New construcrion greater than 45 feet:
- SO-SC^ sharing of constuction costs;
- 75^ local payment of 05M.
• Calls for timely maintenance dredging.
• Port by port user fees for construction and
maintenance in those few ports that need and
can share costs.
b. Status
• Referred to Committees on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, Public Works and Transportation,
and to Rules.
• Unanimously approved by Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries.
• Synder (R-KY) amraendment requiring 4 percent
of dry bulk imports/exports be carried on O.S.
flag ships unanimously passed.
3- HR46g1 Port and Wa terways Maintenance, Development
^nd Improvement Act of 1981
a. Description
• Introduced Oct. 5, 1981 by Wyden (R-OR)
.
• 50-50% sharing for 05M of shallow and deep
draft waterway improvements.
• 50-50% sharing for new construction greater
than 13.5 meters (44.3 feet),
• Uniform national tonnage fee on all interna-
tional commerce (commodity specific).
• Fees deposited in Inland Waterways Trust Fund





• Referred to committees on Public Works and




• Introduced Oct. 21, 198 1 by Smith (D-PA) .
• Prohibits user fees for dredging or mainte-
nance of any channels in U.S. navigational
waters.
b. Status
• Referred to Public Works and Transporation
Committee.
5- HR Mil National Defense Port System Act of ^9 8^
a. Description
• Introduced Oct. 29, 1981 by Matsui (D-CA) and
co-sponsored by Fazio (D-CA), Chappie (R-CA),
Derwinski (R-IL), Garza (D-TX) , Mitchele
(D-MD), Murphy (D-PA), Bonker (D-WA)
, Ginn
(D-GA) , Gerngrich (R-GA) , Lantos (D-CA),
Gibbons (D-FL), Hatcher (D-GA), Wilson (D-TX),
Napier (R-SC) , Harlnett (R-SC) , and Lehman
(D-FL)
.
• Treasury to collect uniform national fees on
ships drawing less than or equal to 45 feet.
• These fees go into a Port System Trust Fund
which is used by the federal government for
new projects to 45 feet and for OSM of chan-
nels and harbors to 45 feet.
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• For new construction greater than 45 feet, the
port can borrow monies from the trust fund and
repay government from port specfic fees
charged on ships or cargoes greater than U5
feet,
b. Status
• Referred to Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee.
6- HR 5276 Multimodal Transportation Act
a- Description
• Introduced December 16, 1981 by Atkinson
(R-PA) , Bowen (D-MS), Applegate (D-OH) and
LuJcan (D-OH),
• "Provides for fair treatment of all modes of
transportation on a fair and euitable
basis. . .
"
• Would return 60 percent of the net annual
customs receipts to the transportation modes,
rail, highway, waterways, and airways, in
proportion to the contribution of each mode to
the import trade.
b. Status
• Jointly referred to the House Energy and
Commerce, Public Works and Transportation, and




1. S 8 09
" a. Description
• Introduced April 1, 1981 as Administration's
proposal to recover dredging coszs for port
improvements by Stafford (R-VT)
.
• Authorizes user fees on traffic through ports.
t. Status
• Opposed by Democratic National Commitee,
2- S 1586 Waterway s Transforation Development and
Improve ment Act of 1 981
a. Description
• Introduced Aug. 3, 1981 by Hatfield (R-OR) and
co-sponored by Thurmond (R-SC)
.
• Allows for commodity specific tonnage charge.
b. Status
• Referred to Committee on Environment and
Public Works.
• Considered dead, has been superseded by S
2217.
3. S 1692 Nat ional Harbors IlErovement and Maintenance
Act of 1981
a. Description
• Introduced Oct. 1, 198 1 by Abdnor (R-SD) and
aoynihan (D-N Y) .
• Ports to pay 25^ of maintenance of deep draft
channels and harbors at depth and width
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currently authorized by law (Deep draft is
considered to be 14 feet).
• 50-50% sharing of maintenance of channels and
harbors deepened by local authorities.
• Ports to repay 100 percent of the cost of all
new channel and harbor projects.
• Authorizes collection of user fees only to
extent that they reflect the service and
benefit of channel/harbor improvement, (User
fees are not mandatory.)
• Authorizes $250 million annually for port
maintenance.
• Establishes a procedure to consolidate into a
two year period the processing of all permits
that may be required prior to construction of
any harbor improvement,
• Allow completion of projects started provided
reimbursement of work undertaken after 9/30/82
is made within 50 years.
• No new construction allowed after 10/1/82
unless in accordance with bill or in interest
of national defense.
b. Status
• Referred to Environment and Public Works
Committee.
• Water Resources Sub-Committee approved.
• Reported out of Environment and Public Works
Committee with several minor amendments.
• Packwood (R-OR) asks for Finance Committee
consideration. He is circulating a letter to




• Reported to the floor in Dec '81 but not
considered due to hold requested by Thurmond
(R-SC) and Hatfield (R-OR)
.
• Democratic National Committee stated
opposition.
• Administration has indicated its support of
this bill.
^- S 2212 National Defense Port System Act of 1982
a. Description
• Introduced March 16, 1982 by Hatfield (R-03)
,
Thurmond (R-SC) , Mattingly (R-GA) , Nickles
(R-OK) and Nunn (D-GA). Hawkins (R-FL) added
as co-sponsor.
• Establishes national uniform duties on
cargoes.
• Calls for the expediting approval and permit-
ting process for deep draft improvements and
r^ated landside facilities.
• Creation of Task Force by Treasury Secretary
to develop a schedule of fees and charges on
all imports and domestic cargoes carried on
vessels with drafts greater than 14 feet.
• Fees will be collected by the IRS (could
designate collection to the Custom Service)
and deposited in a Trust Fund.
• Gives the consent of Congress to local ports
to tax exports. If no local tax is levied,
then the federal government would be allowed
to impose a vessel charge.
• In order for a port to take advantage of the




• The Trust Fund would finance:
- 100% of O&M costs of ports less than 45
feet,
- 90% of all new construction less than 45
feet,
- not available for new construction or main-
tenance greater than 45 feet, for these the
local port authority is required to pay and
reimburse the federal government 100% of
project construction costs directly allo-
cated and attributable to commercial naviga-
tion including interest.
• Allows a state port authority to construct and
maintain any improvements without
Congressional au-chority if no federal funds
are required.
• Retires the St. Lawerence Seaway debt and
includes the Great Lakes as Trust Fund recipi-
ants at the same rates.
b. Status
• Referred to the Senate Finance Committee.
5, S 240 2
a. Description
• Introduced April 20, 1982 by Cochran (R-MS)
and S tennis (D-MS).
• Similiar legislation to HR 5276.
b. Status




HOW COBES PROJECTS ARE CONCEIVED, AUTHORIZED, FUNDED, AND
IMPLEMENTED
1. Public requests assistance from congressional delegation
to solve water resources problems.
2- Committee on Public Works of House or Senate authorizes
study.
3. Ini"::ial funds for study enacted into law.
U, Corps district conducts reconnaissance (Stage 1
Planning) — includes public meeting and other forms of
public involvement.
5. If results of reconnaissance favorable. Corps district
continues study and develops preliminary alternatives
(Stage 2 Planning) — includes public meeting and other
public involvement.
6. Corps district selects several alternatives to develop
in detail and on the basis of further evaluation
tentatively selects plan, which best achieves the
objectives of the study (Stage 3 Planning) — includes
public meeting and the preparation and circulation of
draft report and draft environmental impact statement
(EIS).
7. District engineer submits report and EIS to division
engineer.
8. Division engineer submits report and results of division
review to Board of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors
(BEEH) — includes public notice.
9. BERH reviews district and division recommendations and
issues its findings and recommendations -- includes
public notice of recommendations.
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1G. Chief of Engineers coordinates proposed report and EIS
with Governors of affected States and Federal department
heads.
11. Chief of Engineers report reviewed by Secretary of the
Army and the Office of Management and Budget and
submitted to Congress -- final EIS filed with EPA.
12. Committees on Public Works hold hearings and include
project in authorization bill or authorize by joint
resolutions.
13. Initial funds for Advance Engineering and Design (ASSD)
for project enacted into law — usually several years
after authorization.
14. Corps reaffirms plan based on current conditions and any
new planning criteria applicable to project — includes
a public meeting and other forms of public involvement.
15. If plan reaffirmed, or satisfactorily modified to
accommodate new conditions or criteria. Corps continues
with sufficent engineering and design to award initial
construction contracts.
16. Non-Federal interests required to enter into formal
agreement with Secretary of Army to fulfill their
obligations, as authorized by Congress.
17. Intial funds for construction of project enacted into
law -- requires specific decision by President and
Congress to initiate construction of project.
18. Continuation of engineering and design and project
construction — may include adjustments based on results
of detailed engineering design.
19. Completion of project construction.




FORTRAN PROGRAM TO COMPUTE COST AND COAL CAPACITIES
$JOB
CSS!>2^j«s*t;3rt:^7ARIABLE DEF INITIO NS^^'^^*-^^?'^^*'*
C
C DRGEFF = EFFECT ON ADDITIONAL CAPACITY UTILIZATION
C IF DREDGING IS NOT ACCOMPLISHED
Q
C APPRAISAL OF COMMITMENT TO CONSTRUCT
C CO AL FACILITY
C HARD , MED, SOFT, VSO FT : ESTIMATE OF LIKELIHOOD THAT
C FACILITY WILL BE BUILT
C
C THE FOLLOWING ABBREVIATIONS REPLACE ••???" IN THE
C OTHER VARIABLE NAMES:
C HAM = HAMPTON RAODS
C BAL = BALTIMORE
C NYC = NEW YORK CITY
C PHL = PHILADELPHIA
C MHC = MOREHEAD CITY
C MOB = MOBILE
C NWO = NEW ORLEANS / BATON ROUGE
Q
C CUR??? = CURRENT COAL CAPACITY OF A PARTICULAR PORT IN
C MILLION TONS (MT)
C ???PJ1 = ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL CAPACITY OF THAT PORT
C IF COAL PROJECT # IS COMPLETED. (MT)
C ETN??? = EXPECTED ADDITIONAL CAPACITY (MT) OF THE PORT
C PROJECTS COMPUTED IN RELATION TO LIKELIHOOD
C OF COMPLETION.
C TON??? = COMPUTED UTILIZATION OF ADDITIONAL COAL
C CAPACITY (MT) FROM PROJECTS IN THE PORT
C WITHOUT DREDGING.
C CST??? = TOTAL COST OF DREDGING THE PORT IN $M
C PER??? = PER CENT OF DREDGING COST THE PORT IS
C WILLING TO PAY {%)
C GPI??? = GROWTH POTENTIAL INDEX (GPI) OF THE PORT.
C
C COST = TOTAL COST TO DREDGE SELECTED PORTS UNDER
C CONSIDERATION.
C TONAGE = TOTAL COAL CAPACITY OF ALL PORTS UNDER
C CONSIDERATION.
C




























































C COMPUTE EXPECTED ADDITIONAL PHYSICAL CAPACITY OF EACH
C PORT BASED ON ESTIMATES OF LIKELIHOOD THAT PROJECTS
C ONDEE CONSIDERATION WILL BE COMPLETED.
C
ETNHAM = HAMPJ1 * HARD ^ HAMPJ2 ^ HARD ^ HAMFJ3 ^- HARD
+ + HAMPJ4 ^ HARD
ETNBAL = BALPJ1 ^ HARD ^ BALPJ2 * HARD + BALPJ3 ^ SOFT
ETNNYC = NYCPJ1 * SOFT + NYCPJ2 * SOFT + NYCPJ3 * SOFT
ETNPHL = PHLPJ1 =* HARD
ETNMHC = MHCPJ1 ^ VSOFT
ETNMOB = M0BPJ1 « HARD
ETNN»0 = NW0PJ1 * HARD + NW0PJ2 " SOFT
C
C COMPOTE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL CAPACITY UTILIZED I?
C DREDGING IS NOT COMPLETED.
C
TONHAM = DEGEFF !55 ETNHAM
TCNBAL = DEGEFF « ETNBAL
TONNYC =: DRGEFF * ETNNYC
TONPHL = DEGEFF ^ ETNPHL
TONMHC = DEGEFF a ETN MHC
TONMOB = DRGEFF « ETNMOB






























ENUMERATE ALL POSSIBLE COMBINATIONS OF DREDGING PORTS,
COMPUTE TOTAL FEDERAL COST TO DREDGE PORTS AND COMPUTE
TOTAL CAPACITY UTILIZED IN EACH COMBINATION.
DO 70 A=1,2,1
DO 60 B=1, 2,
1




































































BAL + K* (1-DRGEFF) ^ETNNYC
PHL + M^> (1-DRGEFF) ^ETNMHC
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HAMPTON ROADS = '
BALTIMORE = ' F6.A
'712)
F6.4)
NEW YORK CITY =
PHILADELPHIA = •,
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